Features » August 23, 2009 » Web Only

Rethinking Venezuelan Politics (cont’d)

A fine balance

The vulnerability of grassroots structures to interference, particularly from local political figures, was made clear in the case of neighborhood organizations that were designed to deepen decentralization beyond the state and municipal levels.

The politicization of these organizations occurred with the formation of the Local Councils of Public Planning (CLPP). According to legislation passed in 2002, the CLPPs were to choose priority projects for their respective communities. The mayors, however, ended up controlling many of the CLPPs, thus violating the spirit of the legislation. When a law passed in April 2006 basically replaced the CLPPs with Community Councils, Chávez insisted that the new bodies be led by community leaders free of commitments to politicians.

“Grassroots” writers underscore the importance of struggles, slogans and actions that empower the non-privileged and excluded sectors of the population. The activity of community groups and social movements during the Chavez period have enhanced the self-confidence and pride of groups such as women, Afro-Venezuelans and indigenous people. The state has played an important initial role in this process of transformation of consciousness, even though in the long run the new mentality encourages the councils to seek greater autonomy.

In spite of the tension that exists between the two approaches, the programs and proposals associated with each one are to a certain extent complementary rather than contradictory or mutually exclusive. Thus, for instance, those who support the grassroots approach embrace Chávez’s call for the creation of “social controllerships”–consisting of popular ad-hoc committees in the communities and other locations–to monitor public programs and probe cases of alleged misuse of state expenditures.

In contrast, the top-down approach urges the strengthening of institutional mechanisms, such as the National Superintendency of Cooperatives (SUNACOOP) of the Ministry of the Communal Economy, which is in charge of overseeing worker cooperatives.

Although both the controllerships and SUNACOOP can function side by side, the two approaches manifest widely different concerns and values. Those who favor the grassroots approach, for example, complain that institutional obstacles created by SUNACOOP block or slow down the legal registration of new cooperatives due to lethargic, inefficient government bureaucrats.

At the same time, those who adhere to the top-down approach argue that the campaign to promote new “socialist” ways of thinking through the grassroots can hardly be viewed as a panacea for the problem of unethical behavior among the beneficiaries of these programs. They insist that SUNACOOP receive sufficient resources to oversee state-financed cooperatives and that it be invested with authority to clamp down on the misuse of funds.

Rank-and-file rancor

On the political front, a purely grassroots approach proved to be largely out of tune with Venezuelan political reality. During the early years of Chávez’s presidency, the prospects of the grassroots approach appeared promising. Not only did social organizations play a constructive role in formulating proposals which were incorporated in the 1999 constitution, but the pro-Chávez “Bolivarian Circles” prospered shortly after that.

Nevertheless, the Circles and other organizations of the Chavista movement proved short-lived as their members enlisted in the missions, cooperatives and other state-sponsored activities that provided them with personal opportunities. Some writers who defend the “grassroots” approach, such as Michael Hardt, have failed to recognize this hard reality, and claim that the growth of autonomous social movements in the barrios is “the most powerful and novel element in Venezuela’s Bolivarian revolution,” rather than its “anti-imperialist stance.”

During the ten years of the Chávez presidency, the assertiveness and self-identification of rank-and-file Chavistas–those unaffiliated with any political party, who adhere to the grassroots approach–have not diminished in intensity. Their perception of “us” versus “them” with reference to their relations with Chavista party leaders is typical of their ongoing resentment toward hierarchical structures, even those committed to revolutionary change.

Many of these Chavistas dropped out of social groups to join state-financed programs including the community councils. Participation in state-initiated and financed activities is a far cry from membership in autonomous social movements extolled by “grassroots” theoreticians.

Nevertheless, their involvement in the missions is significant from a political viewpoint: It cements identification with Chavismo, just as membership in a Chavista social organization, party or union would have done. In spite of their migration from social organizations to state-sponsored programs, their critical attitudes toward political parties (such as the PSUV) and local government, and their support for the grassroots approach, have remained unaltered.

Re-organizing a revolution

The co-existence of support for both grassroots and statist strategies within the Chavista movement over such a lengthy period of time, and Chávez’s own endorsement of elements of both, suggest the necessity of a synthesis. The logical starting point for achieving such a synthesis is the democratization of the Chavista party to create mechanisms for the rank-and-file to participate in decision-making in accordance with the grassroots approach, while maintaining a centralized command and enforcing internal discipline.

Recent proposals put forward by Chavistas and sometimes endorsed by Chávez in favor of party re-organization are designed to generate formal debate in such arenas as ideological conferences, internal elections and party publications that would open opportunities for different Chavista political currents to formulate positions. (Indeed, internal democratization without ideological clarification leads eventually to vacuous factionalism based on personality differences.)

The coalescence of Chavista parties and social organizations into the PSUV in 2007 (which held internal primaries for the selection of candidates for governor and mayor the following year) provides a golden opportunity to breathe new life into the Chavista party and to deepen democracy. At the same time, however, the PSUV runs the risk of suppressing diversity within the movement in the name of the long-term goal of “twenty-first century socialism,” which still awaits definition.

Indeed, it is the everyday practice of the Chavista government and movement that will determine the outcome of Venezuela’s fledgling model. The transformation still underway in Venezuela is certain to become an important point of reference for political observers and activists throughout the world for years to come. Hopefully the debate it inspires ends up being richer and more productive than the disputes between the various “isms” (Trotskyism, Stalinism, Maoism, etc.) that so fragmented the Left in the past.

This article was adapted from Ellner’s book Rethinking Venezuelan Politics: Class, Conflict, and the Chavez Phenomenon, which has just been re-issued in paperback by Lynee Rienner Publishers. The book can be ordered here.