Vladimiro Montesinos finally has emerged from the shadows. Throughout
much of President Alberto Fujimori's regime, Montesinos has controlled
Peru's National Intelligence Service (SIN), key positions in the
military and, to a large extent, the president himself. But after
the broadcast of a videotape showing Montesinos paying $15,000 to
an opposition congressman to switch to Fujimori's party, the president
announced he would resign from office, hold new elections and "deactivate"
SIN. The real reasons for Fujimori's actions, however, are rooted
in popular disgust with 10 years of corrupt rule as well as Montesinos'
close relations with the CIA. With the help of U.S. officials, Montesinos
fled to Panama, where he was granted temporary asylum.
Gustavo Gorriti was the first journalist to investigate Montesinos.
As a result of his investigations, which began in 1983 and uncovered
much of the information just surfacing in the U.S. media, the award-winning
Peruvian journalist was forced to leave the country in 1992. Now
associate editor of Panama's La Prensa newspaper, Gorriti
spoke with In These Times from Panama City.
Who is Montesinos?
Montesinos was cashiered from the army in the late '70s for, among
other things, suspicion of selling military secrets to American
intelligence. Then, after a stint in military prison, he became
a narco-lawyer and an all-around strategist, legal and otherwise,
for various drug-trafficking organizations. By 1986, he had insinuated
his way back to advising people in powerful positions in law enforcement,
such as the attorney general. And again, he became an intelligence
source for the CIA.
|
A protest rally in downtown
Lima on September 18. The headline
on the sign reads: "Behind every great dictator stands
a big assasin.
Death penalty for the traitor Montesinos."
REUTERS
|
Then the opportunity of his life came [in 1990] when Alberto Fujimori
surged out of nowhere to become the new president of Peru--and a man
with several potential scandals in need of a fixer. Montesinos provided
those services and began a "Siamese twin" political relationship with
Fujimori, in which Montesinos was the one who planned the abrogation
of democracy in Peru, replacing it with a de facto dictatorship.
The organization that really controlled Peru was Montesinos' intelligence
service, which grew exponentially during those years and concentrated
not only on the usual aspects of intelligence gathering and processing,
but on government and private economic activity. He was an influence
peddler and a partner in almost every enterprise, through privatization
schemes and the awarding of government contracts and licenses.
In the process, Montesinos demonstrated total ruthlessness that
allowed him to swamp all opposition, including within the armed
forces--where he elevated those closely related or indebted to him
and thereby gained a tremendous degree of control.
In the past, Montesinos and Fujimori have been corrupt, violated
human rights and rigged elections--without losing power. Now documentation
of a relatively minor act--bribing an elected official--appears
to have taken them down. What's different?
It is a cumulative effect. We are talking about a regime that had
sowed all the conditions to raise discontent among the people. The
degree of alienation from the government has been increasing. The
reasons are wide-ranging, from an economy that--despite all the
statistical manipulation and misinformation--was entering hyper-recession,
to a widespread perception of corruption within the regime, to a
pattern of overt abuses and an insulting degree of misinformation
through the government-controlled or -influenced press.
In the 2000 electoral campaign, the first two opposition candidates,
who had sizable pluralities, were shot down through a relentless,
withering campaign of character assassination. The subsequent massive
outpouring of support for Alejandro Toledo wasn't just backing for
him, but also an expression of opposition to the regime. There was
such extensive vote-rigging in the first round and then in the runoff
that it would have embarrassed even the North Koreans.
But even then Fujimori's party didn't achieve a plurality, so,
in addition to calling on moles they had planted within the opposition,
they began a massive campaign of buying opposition votes to gain
majority power in congress. The prostitution of this regime just
became too much for the people.
How did it happen that Montesinos was taped in his own office?
It was the Nixon syndrome.
It was his own taping system?
Of course. Montesinos had wired the whole area so that he had a
tape of every interview as a way of pressuring and blackmailing
people eventually. We're talking about thousands of tapes. That
is part of how he maintained power.
Somebody got that tape though and used it against him.How did
that happen?
There was a long-standing struggle between investigative reporters
on the side of democracy and spies on the other. But disaffected
spies--some patriotic people shocked by Montesinos' seizure of organizations
they loved, and some people resentful of mistreatment by Montesinos--contributed
to widespread leaking. And then there were so many tapes, which
are so easily mixed up or duplicated, it was very difficult to keep
them secure. One of the things that prompted Fujimori and the others
to withdraw was their knowledge that several more tapes were missing.
What has been the U.S. role through all this? According to the
New York Times, the United States was providing some funds
for SIN until last year. Now the administration appears to have
soured on the regime and told Fujimori to dump Montesinos. Even
the CIA, which stood by Montesinos until recently, became fed up.
Additionally, people within the State Department, like Peter Romero,
the top official for the Western Hemisphere, have strongly and unequivocally
said that they should get rid of Montesinos.
But perhaps a greater immediate factor for the United States is
the case of the smuggled Russian weapons. Some 10,000 Russian assault
rifles were purportedly bought by the Peruvian army from the Jordanian
army, and air-dropped into Colombian jungle territory controlled
by FARC guerrillas.
The press had been investigating the incident for some months when
suddenly Fujimori--and Montesinos, who never appeared in public--held
a press conference to say that Montesinos had cracked the case and
found the culprits: two junior army officers. Fujimori heatedly
defended that version, which unraveled completely a few days later.
The Colombian, Jordanian and American governments called that scenario
ridiculous and maintained that the weapons had been officially sold
directly to the Peruvian army, which had smuggled them to the guerrillas
with high-level army participation.
Why would Montesinos be supporting FARC? Is it just for the
money or is it in connection with drug trafficking?
This is a mafia government run by gangsters. So first, the money
and possibly drugs. Second, to make [Colombian President] Andres
Pastrana fail miserably. Remember that Fujimori criticized Pastrana's
policy attempts to bring peace to Colombia and advanced his own
supposedly tough approach. Lima had even leaked to the press that
Peru was concentrating troops on the border with Colombia to prevent
FARC advances, while at the same time giving them weapons.
You must understand that, as so often happens with spies, Montesinos
got so wrapped up in tactics, intrigues and his own dirt that he
completely lost sight of strategic goals. He clashed directly with
national security imperatives of the United States, which is in
a very clear position now of supporting Pastrana through [the $1.3
billion] Plan Colombia, a sort of bilateral approach to both fighting
drugs and guerrillas. And then you have somebody trying to weaken
Pastrana and his approach, and also earning some money in the process--obviously,
he becomes a threat.
And I think that explains some of the very harsh words that were
said about Montesinos and the unequivocal message given by [Secretary
of State] Madeleine Albright to Fujimori to jettison his intelligence
chief. The United States was quite angry, I think, with Montesinos,
and also quite embarrassed because they have been in bed with him
for so many years.
Just recently the CIA released documents that Gen. Manuel Contreras
of Chile--who was responsible for the 1976 assassination of Orlando
Letelier and Ronnie Moffitt in Washington--had been on the CIA payroll.
Do you see any parallel between the U.S. role with Montesinos and
its association with Contreras?
I think the association of Montesinos with the intelligence establishment
was much closer than Contreras ever had. He was the U.S. intelligence
establishment's most important source in Peru. The parallel with
[former Panamanian dictator] Manuel Noriega is closer.
What about the drug war? U.S. drug czar Barry McCaffrey had
for some time supported Montesinos.
McCaffrey's brain activity poses no danger of creating any seismic
event. There is no doubt whatsoever about Montesinos' role in drug
trafficking. In the '90s there were so many consistent accusations
of his taking part or taking protection money, that only blind people
could fail to see it. But the United States consistently ignored
it.
You have been documenting Montesinos for a long time. How does
it feel to see him finally exposed in a way that is incontrovertible
and public?
It was long overdue. I have followed his career since 1983, and
he has followed mine, too. He has tried to silence me, and I have
relentlessly continued to expose him. But I don't feel any sense
of vindication. The evidence was there, all the time, and it has
taught me many practical lessons about the relationship of policy-making
and diplomacy to truth. And most of these lessons aren't pleasant,
but that's the way things are. As a journalist I have to continue
trying to bring clear facts to the public, to the readers so they
can't be confused by the jargon of politics, the euphemisms of diplomacy
and by all the things hiding the truth--and sometimes, as it was
in this case, that truth is nasty, very nasty.
|