With 62,000 acres of coca destroyed, the politicians and generals
in Washington and Bogota are calling Plan Colombia's initial fumigation
campaign a success. But on the ground in Putumayo, Colombia's principal
coca growing region, people watched in horror as the deadly mist
drifted down and stuck to everything in sight. Their food crops
turned brown, wilted and slowly died. Their children and animals
became sick. If death didn't come at the hands of the guerrillas,
the paramilitaries or the Colombian army, it fell out of the sky.
The fumigation campaign began on December 19. For the next six
weeks, U.S.-supplied helicopters swooped down almost daily to unload
soldiers whose mission was to prevent attacks by leftist guerrillas
and right-wing paramilitaries. The aerial spraying dumped an estimated
85,000 gallons of the herbicide glyphosate onto Putumayo's coca
fields from an altitude of 100 feet. The fumigation campaign in
Putumayo utilized two of the three U.S.-trained anti-narcotics battalions
and 15 of the 60 helicopters that are part of the $1.3 billion aid
package approved by Congress last year.
Serious questions have been raised about the tactics used during
the fumigation. Even
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A Colombian crop duster drops
herbicide on poppy fields.
JAVIER CASELL/REUTERS
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Monsanto--the manufacturer of Round-Up Ultra, the chemical used for
coca eradication in Colombia--
cautions against aerial application at altitudes greater than 10 feet
above crops because higher altitudes increase the risk of drift. Monsanto
also warns that "even very small amounts of Round-Up herbicide brands
may damage crops if allowed to drift into fields adjoining the target
area."
Another reason the herbicide is so destructive, says Ivan Rios,
spokesman for Colombia's largest guerrilla group, the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), is because "they are fumigating
with glyphosate mixed with a special ingredient that sticks to the
leaves and is more harmful to the people."
That "special ingredient" is called Cosmo-Flux, which according
to Ricardo Vargas Meza, a researcher for Accion
Andina, an organization studying drug policy in the Andes, "makes
the glyphosate heavier and stickier so it adheres better to the
coca plants."
Cosmo-Flux also makes the herbicide more potent. "Cosmo-Flux substantially
increases the biological activity of the agrochemicals, allowing
better results with smaller doses," says Dr. Elsa Nivia, Colombia's
Regional Director of the Pesticide
Action Network. But the fumigation campaign is adding Cosmo-Flux
to an herbicide dosage five times greater than that recommended
by Monsanto.
According to many campesinos in Putumayo, the herbicide also contaminated
maize, yucca, plantains, animals and even children. Some of the
families who fled the fumigation are now living in rundown wooden
shacks in the town of San Miguel near the Ecuador border. Cecilia,
a middle-aged woman who, along with her husband and three children,
abandoned their farm in La Dorada in January after it had been fumigated,
says, "everything was killed. Maize, yucca, everything." She now
sells home-cooked food to travelers crossing the border in a struggle
to support her family. Even the leader of Putumayo's paramilitary
forces, Commandante Enrique, admits that "if you go to San Miguel
you can find campesinos who don't have food and money because the
fumigation was indiscriminate."
The local hospital in La Hormiga has witnessed some of the human
health consequences of the fumigation campaign. "I have treated
people with skin rashes, stomach aches and diarrhea caused by the
fumigation," says Dr. Edgar Perea. "And I have treated five children
affected by the fumigation in the past 25 days. I don't know how
many the other doctors have treated."
Prior to launching the offensive, the government offered $1,000
and technical assistance to those willing to switch from coca to
alternative crops, along with a promise that their farms would not
be fumigated. Some campesinos accepted the offer, while others,
distrustful of a government that has repeatedly failed to deliver
on past promises, steadfastly refused. "Historically, the government
has never helped anyone here," one La Hormiga resident explained.
"People helped themselves, and with coca the economy is good. Now
the government wants to help, but people are afraid it will ruin
the economy."
When the eradication campaign began, many of the small farmers
who had accepted the government's offer stood by helplessly while
the aerial fumigation killed their newly planted crops. But according
to Col. Blas Ortiz of the Colombian army's Putumayo-based 24th Brigade,
the fumigation campaign only targeted "industrial sized" coca farms
of 25 acres or more. Furthermore, Ortiz claims, "One of the techniques
used by the big coca growers is to grow two acres of yucca or plantains
in the middle of 125 acres of coca. These two acres don't belong
to the campesinos, they belong to the big coca grower. They use
this strategy to avoid being fumigated."
Ruben Dario Pinzon of the National
Plan for Alternative Development (PLANTE), the government agency
in charge of the alternative crop program, sympathizes with the
campesinos. "Growers financed by PLANTE have been fumigated because
they are a small area in the middle of coca growers," he says. "It
is impossible to protect them because the pilots can't control exactly
where they fumigate. They fumigate the whole area."
The indiscriminate nature of the fumigation campaign has led many
to call for a greater emphasis on manual eradication, which would
avoid damaging food crops. "PLANTE is fighting to end fumigation
in the six municipalities in which we are working," Pinzon says,
"so we can start the process of alternative crops and then begin
negotiations with other towns."
But most coca farming occurs in remote areas that lack the infrastructure
required to transport perishable crops to distant cities and ports.
And if the number of campesinos turning to alternative crops continues
to increase, production will likely surpass local demand and drive
prices down. Consequently, impoverished campesinos will face the
same economic problems that forced them to turn to coca cultivation
in the first place. When asked if PLANTE intends to help campesinos
get their alternative crops to market, Pinzon laments, "At this
time it is not possible to propose such an economic plan. It is
desirable that the government subsidize some items like they do
in the United States and Europe. But in Colombia it's not possible
because we do not have the money."
It is the lack of social and economic funding in the U.S. aid package
that is criticized by many in Colombia and the international community.
Many organizations do not believe coca can be successfully eradicated
until more money and resources are used to create viable economic
alternatives. The campesino who cultivates coca does not have to
be concerned with getting his crop to market before it spoils. The
narcotrafficker comes to him. Also, coca is a hardier plant than
most legal crops and can reap three or four harvests a year. And
if the grower is willing to perform the first step of processing
into coca paste, he will be paid more than if he just sold the leaves.
The local farmer is not getting rich from this illicit crop, but
the $1,000 a year he can earn from two or three acres of coca cultivation
helps prevent his family from going hungry.
Local officials are now desperately trying to convince Washington
and Bogota to permanently suspend the aerial fumigation before there
is a further destruction of legal crops and a renewed exodus of
people. But their pleas have fallen on deaf ears. The politicians
and generals are too busy celebrating the campaign's success and
planning future operations. For the campesinos of Putumayo, it is
only a matter of time before death once again begins falling from
the sky. 
Garry M. Leech is the editor of Colombia Report
(www.colombiareport.org).
Research for this article was funded in part by the Dick Goldensohn
Fund (www.dickgoldensohn.org).
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