The Misruling Class

Meritocracy worship bedevils America.

Christopher Hayes

Editor’s Note: In a Feb­ru­ary 2006 In These Times cov­er sto­ry titled In the Search of Sol­i­dar­i­ty,” Christo­pher Hayes, then a senior edi­tor for the mag­a­zine, wrote:

Right now, our pol­i­tics are atom­ized and trans­ac­tion­al: we send checks, we sign peti­tions, we for­ward arti­cles. We buy sweat-free clothes, recy­cle and look for voca­tions that don’t col­lude too egre­gious­ly with evil. But we’ve uncon­scious­ly cir­cum­scribed the bound­aries of polit­i­cal action. … As the Amer­i­can Right offers that redun­dant canard moral val­ues” as its lodestar, the Left should offer sol­i­dar­i­ty. Not ret­ro­grade broth­er­hood, or faith-spe­cif­ic fel­low­ship, but some­thing more robust and dif­fi­cult and reward­ing. The uplift of col­lec­tive enterprise.”

In his just pub­lished book Twi­light of the Elites: Amer­i­ca After Mer­i­toc­ra­cy (Crown), from which this essay is adapt­ed, Hayes calls for cit­i­zens to stand in sol­i­dar­i­ty against the mis­rule of mem­bers of America’s reign­ing meritocracy.

We now oper­ate in a world in which we can assume nei­ther com­pe­tence nor good faith from the author­i­ties. The con­se­quences of this sim­ple, dev­as­tat­ing real­iza­tion define Amer­i­can life. The fail­ure of the elites and the dis­trust it has spawned is the most pow­er­ful and least under­stood aspect of cur­rent pol­i­tics and soci­ety. It struc­tures and con­strains the very process by which we gath­er facts, form opin­ions, and exe­cute self-gov­er­nance. It con­nects the Iraq War and the finan­cial cri­sis, the Tea Par­ty and MoveOn, the despair of laid-off autowork­ers in Detroit to the fore­closed home­own­ers in Las Vegas and the res­i­dents of the Low­er Ninth Ward in New Orleans: noth­ing seems to work. All the smart peo­ple fucked up, and no one seems will­ing to take responsibility.

The key both to Barack Oba­ma’s polit­i­cal suc­cess and to his polit­i­cal set­backs lies in his abil­i­ty to con­nect to our core sense of betray­al and his inabil­i­ty to deliv­er us from elite failure.

Twilight of the Elites cover image

Oba­ma only had a fight­ing chance at the Demo­c­ra­t­ic nom­i­na­tion because of the cred­i­bil­i­ty bestowed by his appear­ance at a 2002 Chica­go ral­ly oppos­ing the inva­sion of Iraq, where he referred to the impend­ing inva­sion as a dumb war.” He, alone among the lead­ing con­tenders, was able to see that the emper­or had no clothes. He invoked, time and time again, the great social move­ments in Amer­i­can his­to­ry that attacked the author­i­ty of the unjust insti­tu­tions that pre­served the sta­tus quo. And he advanced a cri­tique of Amer­i­can pol­i­tics at the end of the Bush years that homed in on the fun­da­men­tal dys­func­tions, improp­er depen­den­cies, and imbal­ances of pow­er that had led to the mess we were in.

But as much as Oba­ma spoke to the desire of Amer­i­cans for recon­struc­tion, and reform, he also cul­ti­vat­ed the sup­port of those mem­bers of the elite who had grown dis­gust­ed with and weary of the Bush admin­is­tra­tion, and who longed for restora­tion of author­i­ty rather than a rev­o­lu­tion from below. Barack Oba­ma may have con­stant­ly invoked his years as a com­mu­ni­ty orga­niz­er in Chica­go, but he spent just as much time at Har­vard Law.

In his very first speech as pres­i­dent, Oba­ma avoid­ed cas­ti­gat­ing the estab­lish­ment and instead urged Amer­i­cans to trust in it once again. He acknowl­edged that there was a sap­ping of con­fi­dence across our land; a nag­ging fear that Amer­i­ca’s decline is inevitable, that the next gen­er­a­tion must low­er its sights.” But rather than use the speech to explain just how and why our con­fi­dence was sapped, he instead announced that sheer will and deter­mi­na­tion would be the key to repair­ing our bro­ken trust: Start­ing today, we must pick our­selves up, dust our­selves off, and begin again the work of remak­ing America.”

In 2008, trust in a num­ber of insti­tu­tions, most notably the pres­i­den­cy, shot up, born on a wave of opti­mism ush­ered in by the begin­ning of the Oba­ma era. For a year, trust in the pres­i­dent as an insti­tu­tion was above 50 per­cent. But by 2010 it had plum­met­ed back down toward Bush lev­els in the after­math of Hur­ri­cane Katrina.

Part of the rea­son for that decline was that despite his cam­paign promis­es to take on the sys­tem,” the pres­i­dent has oper­at­ed safe­ly with­in it.

Cor­rupt and dysfunctional

Three decades of accel­er­at­ing inequal­i­ty in Amer­i­ca have pro­duced a deformed social order and a set of elites who can­not help but be dys­func­tion­al and cor­rupt. Most of us don’t see it that way, because we get elites wrong.

We don’t acknowl­edge that our own most fun­da­men­tal, shared beliefs about how soci­ety should oper­ate are deeply elit­ist. We have accept­ed that there will be some class of peo­ple that will make the deci­sions for us, and if we just man­age to find the right ones, then all will go smoothly.

To recov­er from the dam­age inflict­ed by this cri­sis of author­i­ty, we must recon­struct and rein­vent our pol­i­tics, a process that has, in a sense, already begun. Andrew Smith, an orga­niz­er with Occu­py Wall Street, told me one fall evening in 2011 that the move­ment is not Left or Right, but up or down.” Amid drums and whoops and chants of We! Are! The 99 per­cent!” he leaned in and said, I real­ize that’s scary for some people.”

Beyond Left and Right isn’t just a mot­to. To those clued in to elite fail­ure, Left/​Right dis­tinc­tions are less salient than those between what I call insur­rec­tion­ists and institutionalists.

Paul Krug­man is one promi­nent exam­ple of an insur­rec­tion­ist. A man who was once a defend­er of elite com­pe­tence and neolib­er­al tech­noc­ra­cy against its pop­ulist foes, he has come to believe there is some­thing very wrong with the peo­ple run­ning the country.

The expe­ri­ence of the fail decade has made Krug­man pro­found­ly skep­ti­cal of elite opin­ion and what he deri­sive­ly calls Very Seri­ous Peo­ple. He now approv­ing­ly cites such insur­rec­tion­ist heroes as Nao­mi Klein, author of The Shock Doc­trine, some­thing that would have been unthink­able a decade before.

On the oth­er side are the insti­tu­tion­al­ists, who see the ero­sion of author­i­ty and declin­ing pub­lic trust as a ter­ri­fy­ing trend. Like Edmund Burke, the insti­tu­tion­al­ists look on aghast as pil­lar insti­tu­tions are attacked as deca­dent and dis­solute by the unin­formed rabble.

Insti­tu­tion­al­ists live in fear of a soci­ety with­out cen­tral repos­i­to­ries of author­i­ty, one that could col­lapse into mob rule at any time. The New York Times colum­nist David Brooks is insti­tu­tion­al­is­m’s most acces­si­ble advo­cate and in 2009 he laid out its vision. Cit­ing the polit­i­cal sci­en­tist Hugh Heclo, who wrote the book On Think­ing Insti­tu­tion­al­ly, Brooks writes that the insti­tu­tion­al­ist has a deep rev­er­ence for those who came before and built up the rules that he has tem­porar­i­ly tak­en deliv­ery of … . Lack of insti­tu­tion­al aware­ness has bred cyn­i­cism and under­mined habits of behavior.”

Which side are you on?

What divides the insti­tu­tion­al­ist from the insur­rec­tion­ist is a dis­agree­ment over whether the great­est threat we face is dis­trust — a dark and nihilis­tic ten­den­cy that will pro­duce a soci­ety bank­rupt­ed of norms and order — or whether the greater threat is the actu­al malfea­sance and cor­rup­tion of the pil­lar insti­tu­tions them­selves. (While my own insur­rec­tion­ist sym­pa­thies are con­sid­er­able, I am also stalked by the fear that the sta­tus quo, in which dis­cred­it­ed elites and insti­tu­tions retain their pow­er, can just as eas­i­ly pro­duce destruc­tive and anti­so­cial impuls­es as it can spur trans­for­ma­tion and reform. Call it my inner David Brooks. When peo­ple come to view all for­mal author­i­ty as fraud­u­lent, good gov­er­nance becomes impos­si­ble, and a vicious cycle of offi­cial mis­con­duct and low expec­ta­tions kicks in.)

Whether you align your­self with the insti­tu­tion­al­ist or the insur­rec­tion­ist side of the debate comes down to just how rot­ten you think our cur­rent pil­lar insti­tu­tions and rul­ing class are. Can they be gen­tly reformed at the mar­gins or must they be rad­i­cal­ly over­hauled, per­haps even destroyed and rebuilt?

Barack Oba­ma seemed to sug­gest he was on the side of those who favored rad­i­cal over­haul, but he has gov­erned as a man who believes in reform at the mar­gins. And how could he do any­thing but? He is, after all, a prod­uct of the very insti­tu­tions that are now in such man­i­fest cri­sis. The cen­tral trag­ic irony of the pres­i­den­cy of Barack Oba­ma is that his elec­tion marked the crown­ing achieve­ment of the post-1960s mer­i­toc­ra­cy, just at the moment that the sys­tem was implod­ing on itself.

Like all rul­ing orders, the mer­i­toc­ra­cy tends to cul­ti­vate with­in its most priv­i­leged mem­bers an abid­ing devo­tion. Recruit­ment into the top ranks of the mer­i­toc­ra­cy also cul­ti­vates a dis­po­si­tion to trust one’s fel­low mer­i­to­crats and to lis­ten close­ly to those who occu­py the inner cir­cle of win­ners. Oba­ma’s faith lay in cream ris­ing to the top,” writes Jonathan Alter in his chron­i­cle of Oba­ma’s first year, The Promise. Because he him­self was a prod­uct of the great Amer­i­can post­war mer­i­toc­ra­cy, he could nev­er ful­ly escape see­ing the world from the sta­tus lad­der he had ascended.”

Mer­i­toc­ra­cy’s good intentions

The last cri­sis of author­i­ty, the icon­ic, long peri­od of social upheaval we refer to as the six­ties,” also rep­re­sent­ed what would be the high point for eco­nom­ic equal­i­ty in the coun­try. Labor unions were strong, wages steadi­ly ris­ing, and basic com­po­nents of mid­dle-class life — health­care, hous­ing and high­er edu­ca­tion — acces­si­ble to more house-holds than ever in the nation’s history.

But the coun­try was also gross­ly unequal along lines of race, gen­der and sex­u­al ori­en­ta­tion, and con­trolled by a rel­a­tive­ly small, self-con­tained set of white Anglo-Sax­on men. By wag­ing a sus­tained assault on the estab­lish­ment respon­si­ble for per­pet­u­at­ing the Viet­nam War, patri­archy and racial dis­crim­i­na­tion, the social move­ments of that era per­ma­nent­ly trans­formed Amer­i­can soci­ety for the better.

In place of the old WASP estab­lish­ment, Amer­i­ca embraced mer­i­toc­ra­cy, an ide­al with roots that reach back to the ear­ly years of the Repub­lic. By open­ing the doors to women and racial minori­ties, while also valu­ing youth over senior­i­ty and indi­vid­ual tal­ent over the qui­et virtues of the Orga­ni­za­tion Man, it incor­po­rat­ed the demands of the social move­ments of the 1960s. But what­ev­er the egal­i­tar­i­an com­mit­ments of the social move­ments that brought about the upheaval of the time, what emerged when the dust had set­tled was a mod­el of the social order that was more open but still deeply unequal.

The mer­i­toc­ra­cy offered lib­er­a­tion from the unjust hier­ar­chies of race, gen­der and sex­u­al ori­en­ta­tion, but swapped in their place a new hier­ar­chy based on the notion that peo­ple are deeply unequal in abil­i­ty and dri­ve. It offers a mod­el of soci­ety that con­fers vast­ly unequal com­pen­sa­tion and resources on the bright and the slow, the indus­tri­ous and the sloth­ful. At its most extreme, this ethos cel­e­brates an aris­toc­ra­cy of tal­ent,” a vision of who should rule that is in deep ten­sion with our demo­c­ra­t­ic com­mit­ments. Mer­i­toc­ra­cy,” as the late his­to­ri­an Christo­pher Lasch once observed, is a par­o­dy of democracy.”

Over the last 30 years our com­mit­ment to this par­o­dy of democ­ra­cy has facil­i­tat­ed accel­er­at­ing and extreme eco­nom­ic inequal­i­ty of a scope and scale unseen since the last Gild­ed Age. There are numer­ous rea­sons for the explo­sion of inequal­i­ty — from glob­al­iza­tion, to tech­nol­o­gy, to the cor­rup­tion of the cam­paign finance sys­tem, to the suc­cess­ful war on orga­nized labor — but the philo­soph­i­cal under­pin­ning for all of this, the fer­tile soil in which it is root­ed, is our shared mer­i­to­crat­ic com­mit­ment. Fun­da­men­tal­ly we still think that a select few should rule; we’ve just changed our cri­te­ria for what makes some­one qual­i­fied to be a mem­ber in good stand­ing of that select few.

At its most basic, the log­ic of mer­i­toc­ra­cy” is iron­clad: putting the most qual­i­fied, best-equipped peo­ple into the posi­tions of great­est respon­si­bil­i­ty and import. You cer­tain­ly would­n’t want sur­geons’ licens­es to be hand­ed out via lot­tery, or to have major cab­i­net mem­bers select­ed through real­i­ty TV – style voting.

But in our near-reli­gious fideli­ty to the mer­i­to­crat­ic mod­el, we over­es­ti­mate its advan­tages and under­ap­pre­ci­ate its costs, because we don’t think hard enough about the con­se­quences of the inequal­i­ty it pro­duces. As Amer­i­cans, we take it as a giv­en that unequal lev­els of achieve­ment are nat­ur­al, even desir­able. Soci­ol­o­gist Jerome Kara­bel, whose work looks at elite for­ma­tion, once said no advanced democ­ra­cy was as obsessed with equal­i­ty of oppor­tu­ni­ty or as rel­a­tive­ly uncon­cerned with equal­i­ty of con­di­tion” as the Unit­ed States.

This is our cen­tral prob­lem. And the solu­tion for cor­rect­ing the excess­es of our extreme ver­sion of mer­i­toc­ra­cy is quite sim­ple: Make Amer­i­ca more equal.

Vision for change

Any vision of egal­i­tar­i­an poli­cies isn’t worth much with­out a vision for how to cre­ate the polit­i­cal space for their adoption.

The first set of obsta­cles has to do with pub­lic opin­ion, or, at least, per­cep­tions of pub­lic opin­ion. It is a wide­ly held view that Amer­i­ca’s less egal­i­tar­i­an social struc­ture is a man­i­fes­ta­tion of a cer­tain kind of Amer­i­can excep­tion­al­ism. But in poll after poll, when asked how they want to reduce the deficit, Amer­i­cans reli­ably choose cut­ting mil­i­tary spend­ing and rais­ing tax­es on the wealthy as their two most favored approaches.

So the obsta­cle to more equal­i­ty is not wide­spread pub­lic oppo­si­tion to a more egal­i­tar­i­an soci­ety. The obsta­cle is sim­ply that peo­ple and insti­tu­tions who ben­e­fit most from extreme inequal­i­ty have out­size pow­er they can use to pro­tect their gains from egal­i­tar­i­an incur­sions. The most press­ing chal­lenge for those who desire a bet­ter func­tion­ing, more rep­re­sen­ta­tive nation is con­ceiv­ing not of poli­cies that will ulti­mate­ly enhance equal­i­ty, but of mech­a­nisms by which the pow­er of the cur­rent elite might be chal­lenged and dra­mat­i­cal­ly reduced.

Because the mer­i­to­crat­ic win­ners are reluc­tant to part with their pow­er, they must be con­vinced that the cur­rent sta­tus quo is unsus­tain­able. Nor­mal­cy is what keeps the sys­tem mov­ing and its inequities unad­dressed — so nor­mal­cy must be dis­rupt­ed. The social dis­tance between the cur­rent ben­e­fi­cia­ries of our post-mer­i­to­crat­ic social order and its vic­tims must be annihilated.

Occu­py Wall Street suc­ceed­ed in trou­bling the waters. By occu­py­ing pub­lic spaces in cities and towns across the coun­try, the pro­test­ers dis­rupt­ed the basic nor­mal­cy of every­day life. May­ors and police and media and fel­low cit­i­zens had to, if noth­ing else, pay atten­tion. And while the mes­sage may have been polar­iz­ing or some­times lost between the var­i­ous inci­dents of police vio­lence and bul­ly­ing, the basic effort was suc­cess­ful in dra­mat­i­cal­ly expand­ing pub­lic con­scious­ness of the basic prob­lem of inequal­i­ty and the rigged game it had created.

But dis­rup­tion as dis­rup­tion isn’t enough. In order to actu­al­ly effect deep and last­ing change, those opposed to the cur­rent social order must locate anoth­er base of pow­er that can cred­i­bly chal­lenge the pow­er of incum­bent interests.

I think the answer lies in a new­ly rad­i­cal­ized upper mid­dle class.

Upper-mid­dle-class power

One of the most inter­est­ing fea­tures of our cur­rent polit­i­cal moment is that a sig­nif­i­cant gulf has opened up between, rough­ly, the top 40 per­cent and the top 1 per­cent — between the mid­dle class, upper mid­dle class, pro­fes­sion­als and the mass afflu­ent on the one hand, and the gen­uine plu­to­crats on the other.

In fact, the two most ener­getic and impor­tant polit­i­cal move­ments of the aughts draw their pop­u­lar con­stituen­cy from the upper mid­dle class: peo­ple with grad­u­ate school degrees, homes, sec­ond homes, kids in good col­leges, and six-fig­ure incomes. This frus­trat­ed, dis­con­tent­ed class has spent a decade with their noses pressed against the glass, watch­ing the win­ners grab more and more for them­selves, seem­ing­ly at the upper mid­dle class’s expense.

On the Left, the most durable new force in the last 10 years is the Net­roots, which includes a host of new pro­gres­sive insti­tu­tions, like MoveOn​.org, and the diarists and read­ers of pro­gres­sive blogs, like Dai­ly Kos. Polling, sur­veys and stud­ies all sug­gest that its base is root­ed in the pro­fes­sion­al upper mid­dle class.

More recent­ly there is Occu­py Wall Street, whose activists skew much younger, but who are drawn from a sim­i­lar class pro­file as MoveOn mem­bers and Dai­ly Kos diarists. Most are col­lege edu­cat­ed, now sad­dled with tens of thou­sands of dol­lars in col­lege debt and no job prospects. They face a fun­da­men­tal mis­match between their abil­i­ties and their oppor­tu­ni­ties. These are mid­dle- and upper- mid­dle-class young peo­ple with mid­dle- and upper-mid­dle-class expec­ta­tions that are being dashed, and it is this frus­tra­tion with a social con­tract that does not deliv­er that so often sows the seeds of rev­o­lu­tion­ary movements.

On the Right, there is the Tea Par­ty move­ment, whose demo­graph­ic was sum­ma­rized in 2010 by The New York Times with the head­line Poll finds tea par­ty back­ers wealth­i­er and more educated.”

Both the Net­roots and the Tea Par­ty, though obvi­ous­ly dif­fer­ent in many ways, share a unit­ing frus­tra­tion. It is the anger of an upper mid­dle class that finds itself increas­ing­ly dis­pos­sessed — class that feels most keen­ly the sense of betray­al, injus­tice and dis­so­lu­tion that the cri­sis of author­i­ty has ush­ered in.

They share a sense that they are no longer in con­trol, that some small, cor­rupt core of elites can launch an idi­ot­ic war, or bail out the banks, or man­date health insur­ance, and despite their rel­a­tive priv­i­lege and edu­ca­tion and mon­ey and social cap­i­tal, there’s not a damn thing they can do about it.

Major social change through­out the coun­try’s his­to­ry has often emerged from strange and ide­o­log­i­cal­ly con­tort­ed coalitions.

Abo­li­tion­ists drew from for­mer slaves like Fred­er­ick Dou­glass, wom­en’s suf­frag­ists, min­is­ters and intel­lec­tu­als. Wom­en’s suf­frage bound togeth­er Democ­rats and rebel fac­tions of the Repub­li­can Par­ty. Pro­hi­bi­tion involved anti-Catholic moral cru­saders and pro­gres­sive suf­frag­ists. Its repeal was brought about by life­long non-drinkers like John D. Rock­e­feller Jr. and life­long alco­holics like Ernest Hemingway.

There have been occa­sion­al, fleet­ing hints of this in our own time. A strange bed­fel­lows Left-Right coali­tion vot­ed down the first TARP and reunit­ed to force the Fed­er­al Reserve to sub­mit to an audit and release records about the details of the extra­or­di­nary actions it took in the fall of 2008 to keep the glob­al finan­cial sys­tem from collapsing.

As activists of these alien­at­ed class­es deep­en their work, the full spec­trum of our insti­tu­tion­al dys­func­tion may chal­lenge their assump­tions about just who it is that is on their team. Spend time with lefty activists in New Orleans and you hear far more with­er­ing and damn­ing indict­ments of gov­ern­ment bureau­cra­cy than you will ever hear from a Cato Insti­tute posi­tion paper. Sim­i­lar­ly, some of the Tea Par­ty activists I’ve spo­ken with over the past few years show an increas­ing real­iza­tion that Big Busi­ness is not their ally, and may be as much of a prob­lem as Big Government.

Ulti­mate­ly I fig­ured out that the real ene­my of the peo­ple, while gov­ern­ment is a tool, it’s real­ly about the spe­cial inter­ests,” Texas Tea Par­ty activist Ter­ri Hall told me in March 2010. The lob­by makes sure they grease the wheels on both sides of the aisle. They work with and buy off any­body. It’s almost like you can’t char­ac­ter­ize it as David and Goliath. It’s a giant ten times the size of Goliath.”

Each side sees itself as David and the oth­er as Goliath. But they are unit­ed in a desire to see the giant slain, to see the old order held to account, the incum­bents — broad­ly con­strued — swept out. Account­abil­i­ty” is the word that comes up most in con­ver­sa­tions with the new insur­rec­tion­ist activists. We can­not achieve equal­i­ty with­out first achiev­ing some mea­sure of account­abil­i­ty for those at the top.

Rethink­ing what divides us

It is easy to list dozens of rea­sons why such a coali­tion will not, can­not, work. But in the wake of some exoge­nous shock to the sys­tem that may change. The most recent and most imag­i­na­tive of the move­ments borne of the cri­sis of author­i­ty, Occu­py Wall Street, seems to under­stand that if change is to hap­pen, it must come about through a very fun­da­men­tal recon­cep­tu­al­iza­tion of our most basic polit­i­cal divi­sions. It’s about class,” Occu­py Wall Street orga­niz­er Andrew Smith told me. Peo­ple can’t uni­fy around par­ty or reli­gion, but we can uni­fy around class.”

The his­to­ry of Amer­i­can pol­i­tics would sug­gest oth­er­wise. But as the invest­ment ads all say: Past per­for­mance is no guar­an­tee of future returns.

The nature of the post-mer­i­to­crat­ic elite is that it can’t help but pro­duce fail­ure. It is too social­ly dis­tant to prop­er­ly man­age the insti­tu­tions with which it has been entrust­ed. We are, as I write this, hurtling toward the cer­tain cri­sis of cat­a­stroph­ic glob­al cli­mate change. Our elites and insti­tu­tions have proven them­selves entire­ly inca­pable of address­ing and fore­stalling the immis­er­a­tion and destruc­tion that now approach like a mete­or. Our finan­cial sys­tem has grown only more con­cen­trat­ed in the wake of the finan­cial cri­sis; the biggest banks have got­ten big­ger, the log­ic of too big to fail even more deeply embed­ded. Inequal­i­ty has got­ten worse in the wake of the cri­sis, and we remain wild­ly overex­tend­ed in our mil­i­tary com­mit­ments, chained to 18th-cen­tu­ry tech­nol­o­gy to pow­er our way of life.

There is, I fear, more cri­sis to come. The imbal­ances of our soci­ety make it unavoidable.

And when the next cri­sis does come, there will once again be a brief moment in which, like that strange day on Capi­tol Hill after Lehman Broth­ers col­lapsed, nor­mal pol­i­tics give way to the idio­syn­crat­ic pol­i­tics of the extra­or­di­nary. And in that con­text, who knows what strange new forces for equi­ty and account­abil­i­ty might emerge?

This essay was adapt­ed from Twi­light of the Elites: Amer­i­ca After Mer­i­toc­ra­cy © 2012 by Christo­pher Hayes. Pub­lished by Crown Pub­lish­ers, a divi­sion of Ran­dom House Inc.

Christo­pher Hayes is the host of MSNBC’s All In with Chris Hayes. He is an edi­tor at large at the Nation and a for­mer senior edi­tor of In These Times.
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